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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Priscilla Adams claims that Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act ("RFRA") requires accommodation of her 
religious beliefs so that her tax payments do not fund the 
military. She also argues that RFRA and the free exercise 
clause mandate a finding that her religious beliefs 
constitute "reasonable cause" under 26 U.S.C. S 6651 for 
her failure to file returns or pay tax and an"unusual 
circumstance" which makes it "against equity and good 
conscience" for the Commissioner to impose the penalty for 
failure to estimate under 26 U.S.C. S 6654. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 
The facts are not in dispute. Adams is a devout Quaker; 
she currently works as a "Peace Field Secretary" for the 
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of 
Friends. She sincerely believes that participation in war is 
contrary to God's will, and hence, that the payment of taxes 
to fund the military is against the will of God. From 1985 
to 1989, Adams declared herself exempt from taxation, so 
no federal income tax would be withheld from her pay. In 
1989, the IRS sent a letter to her employer, the 
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, directing it to withhold taxes 
from her salary as if she were married and claiming one 
withholding allowance. 
 
Adams has taken pains to ensure that she does not profit 
from her tax protests and to demonstrate that her beliefs 
 
                                2 
  
regarding refusal to pay taxes are sincere and are the result 
of being called or directed by God, in that she has been 
tested and challenged by "clearness committees" of 
members of her Meeting that have been convened to 
examine her beliefs on this topic. They have determined 
that the course of her conduct is the result of a"leading" 
from God. She asserts that she would voluntarily pay all of 
her federal income taxes if the money she paid were 
directed to a fund that supported only non-military 
spending, or if her payments could be directed to non- 
military expenditures, or that, with the consultation of a 
clearness committee, she would be willing to consider any 
other form of accommodation of her beliefs that could be 
offered by the government. 
 
The Commissioner assessed deficiencies and penalties 
against Adams for the years 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993, and 
1994. The Tax Court determined that Adams was not 
exempt from the payment of taxes under RFRA and was 
liable for the deficiencies and penalties assessed against 
her, relying on United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), 
and other case law preceding Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990). Adams now appeals to this court. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 7482(a) (1994). 
Our review is plenary, as all of the issues raised are 
matters of law. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 
30 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1994); Lazore v. Commissioner, 
11 F.3d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. RFRA Claim 
 
The parties do not contest the constitutionality or the 
applicability of RFRA to the case at hand. They agree that 
RFRA applies to the federal government, as Boerne v. 
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), held only that RFRA was 
unconstitutional as applied to the states under section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. For the purposes of this 
appeal, we assume without deciding that RFRA is 
 
                                3 
  
constitutional as applied to the federal government. See 
Alamo v. Clay, 137 F.3d 1366, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1998).1 
 
RFRA provides: 
 
       (a) In general 
 
       Government shall not substantially burden a person's 
       exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
       rule of general applicability, except as provided in 
       subsection (b) of this section. 
 
       (b) Exception 
 
       Government may substantially burden a person's 
       exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
       application of the burden to the person -- 
 
       (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
       interest; and 
 
       (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
       compelling governmental interest. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In general, courts that have addressed the question of 
constitutionality have found that RFRA is constitutional as applied to the 
federal government. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998); see also EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 
83 F.3d 455, 468-70 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding RFRA constitutional as 
applied to Title VII, but relying on Fifth Circuit's decision in Boerne); 
but 
see Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171 (Stevens, concurring, questioning 
Establishment Clause implications of RFRA); 141 F.3d at 862-68 (Bogue, 
dissenting); United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 792 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(questioning RFRA's viability in the federal context); In re Gates, 212 
B.R. 
220 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that Boerne overruled RFRA 
altogether). Some commentators have noted that RFRA may be 
unconstitutional as applied to federal law. See  Marci Hamilton, The 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 1 (1998); Aurora R. Bearse, Note, RFRA: Is it Necessary? Is it 
Proper?, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 1045 (1998); Edward J.W. Blatnik, Note, No 
RFRAF Allowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's 
Federal Application in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores, 98 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1410 (1998); but see Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of 
Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 715 (1998) 
(arguing that RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal 
government). 
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Adams argues that under RFRA, she is exempt from 
federal income tax for the years in which she has been 
assessed a deficiency, because requiring her to pay these 
taxes substantially burdens her religious beliefs. She 
concedes that the government has a compelling interest in 
the collection of taxes, but contends that the IRS failed to 
meet its burden under RFRA of proving that it could not 
accommodate her, that is, that there is no less restrictive 
means of furthering the government's interest. She argues 
that this failure of proof requires this court to reverse the 
Tax Court and find that Adams owes no taxes for the years 
in question, and that she is not required to pay income 
taxes so long as the Commissioner does not act to 
accommodate her objections. Adams contends that she is 
not asking to be exempted from the payment of taxes 
altogether, but that she wants her beliefs to be 
"accommodated," because RFRA requires that the IRS 
accommodate her objection, unless the refusal to do so is 
the "least restrictive means" for achieving the government's 
compelling interest in tax collection. The Commissioner 
accepts Adams's acknowledgment that the government has 
a compelling interest in the collection of taxes, and urges 
us to find that the current system -- uniform and 
mandatory in nature -- is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest. 
 
There is little doubt that RFRA was enacted as a direct 
response to Employment Division v. Smith, and to restore 
the tests that were routinely employed before the Supreme 
Court's ruling that neutral, generally applicable laws may 
impinge on religious practices, even in the absence of a 
compelling state interest. See 494 U.S. at 882-84; Boerne, 
117 S. Ct. at 2161. RFRA requires courts to employ the test 
set forth above in the statutory language. First, the 
claimant must demonstrate a "substantial burden" on her 
exercise of her religious beliefs. If she does so, the burden 
shifts to the government to demonstrate that the regulation 
or practice at issue furthers a "compelling interest," and 
that it furthers that interest by the "least restrictive 
means." See S 2000bb-1; Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 
767 (3d Cir. 1996), overruled by 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Small was overruled by Boerne. However, we use this case and other 
cases applying RFRA to state institutions and laws as a guide to how we 
should interpret the statute, although we realize we are not bound by 
their dictates. 
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In enacting RFRA, Congress specifically announced its 
intent to "restore" the "compelling interest" test set forth in 
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder: 
 
       The purposes of this chapter are -- 
 
       (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in 
       Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin 
       v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its 
       application in all cases where free exercise of religion is 
       substantially burdened; and 
 
       (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose 
       religious exercise is substantially burdened by the 
       government. 
 
       S 2000bb(b). 
 
However, Congress's intent with regard to the precise 
contours of the elements of the RFRA test is a somewhat 
different matter, as neither the statutory provisions, the 
legislative history, nor the floor debates indicate exactly 
how the elements of the test are defined, or are defined in 
relation to the pre-Smith case law. See S 2000bb(a); 
S 2000bb-2; S. Rep. No. 103-111 (1993), at 5-9, 15-16, 
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1893, 1894-98, 1904-05; 
see also 139 Cong. Rec. S1415-01, S14515-16 (daily ed. 
Oct. 27, 1993) (statements of Senator Chaffee); 139 Cong. 
Rec. S14461-01, S14462, S14468, S14469 (daily ed. Oct. 
26, 1993) (statements of Senators Feingold, Lieberman, and 
Bradley); 139 Cong. Rec. S14350-01, S14350, S14353 
(daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statements of Senators Kennedy 
and Hatch); 139 Cong. Rec. H2356-03, H2356-59, H2360- 
61 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (remarks of Representatives 
Brooks Edwards, Fish, Hughes, and Schumer); The 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States 
Senate, 102nd Cong. 2, 129-35 (Sept. 18, 1992). While 
prior cases touched on one or more of the aspects of the 
RFRA test, these elements -- substantial burden, 
compelling interest, least restrictive means -- did not 
constitute a comprehensive standard, let alone a uniform or 
established test, prior to Smith.3  The instant case presents 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Supreme Court stated in Boerne,"the Act imposes in every case 
a least restrictive means requirement -- a requirement that was not used 
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the issue, as to whether, and if so, how, we should 
construe RFRA in light of prior case law. The legislative 
history of both the House and the Senate versions of RFRA 
contain explicit indications that prior case law is central to 
the understanding of the compelling interest test: 
 
       The committee wishes to stress that the act does not 
       express approval or disapproval of the result reached 
       in any particular court decision involving the free 
       exercise of religion, including those cited in the act 
       itself. This bill is not a codification of the result 
       reached in any prior free exercise decision but rather 
       the restoration of the legal standard that was applied 
       in those decisions. Therefore, the compelling interest 
       test generally should not be construed more stringently 
       or more leniently than it was prior to Smith. 
 
       S. Rep. No. 103-111 at 9; H.R. Rep. No. 103-88 at 21 
       (1993).4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify." See 117 S. Ct. 
at 2171. We note that this "element" has in fact appeared sporadically in 
those terms or as a "narrowly tailored" requirement. See Smith, 494 U.S. 
at 894-95 (O'Connor, concurring) (noting that in free exercise cases, "we 
have respected both the First Amendment's express textual mandate that 
the governmental interest in regulation of conduct by requiring the 
government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated 
conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest," citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 
680, 699 (1989); Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58, cited in S. Rep. 103-111 at 7; 
see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n., 480 U.S. 136, 140- 
42 (1987) (strict scrutiny applies to free exercise unemployment 
compensation challenge); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 
(1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing 
that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state 
interest.") 
 
4. The floor debates contain an extended "colloquy" between Senators 
Grassley and Hatch that occurred during the Judiciary Committee 
markup of the bill, which states in pertinent part: 
 
Grassley: Does this bill change the way courts assess a "compelling state 
interest"? Will it still be up to the judge -- who will look at all the 
facts 
in the case -- to say whether there is a compelling interest? In other 
words, this bill does not purport to legislate a definition of compelling 
interest, does it? 
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The legislative history accompanying the Senate bill also 
includes the following directive: "The committee expects 
that the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior 
to Smith for guidance in determining whether the exercise 
of religion has been substantially burdened and the least 
restrictive means have been employed in furthering a 
compelling governmental interest." S. Rep. 103-111 at 8-9.5 
Cases decided before Smith involving application of the 
standards to the tax system, or to situations analogous to 
the tax system are, therefore, instructive. In United States 
v. Lee, the Supreme Court rejected a free exercise challenge 
to the imposition of social security taxes based on the fact 
that mandatory participation was necessary to the 
functioning of the social security program, and that a 
voluntary system would be impossible to administer. See 
455 U.S. at 257-59. In so finding, the Court noted: 
 
       Religious beliefs can be accommodated, see, e.g., 
       Thomas, supra; Sherbert, supra, but there is a point at 
       which accommodation would "radically restrict the 
       operating latitude of the legislature." . . . Unlike the 
       situation presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, it 
       would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hatch: RFRA reestablishes a very familiar and traditional standard of 
review that the courts have been applying since the 1963 decision 
Sherbert v. Verner. That is why we do not attempt to define the standard 
in the bill. This bill does not dictate the proper result in a particular 
free 
exercise case nor does it identify specific governmental interests that 
are 
compelling. The courts will continue to determine whether burdens on 
religious exercise are justified, based upon a consideration and weighing 
of all relevant facts and circumstances. Historically, the courts have had 
little difficulty identifying important governmental interests. For 
example, 
the courts have found eradication of racial discrimination to be a 
compelling governmental interest. 
 
139 Cong. Rec. S14461-01, S14470 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993). 
 
5. In enacting RFRA, Congress seized upon language from Supreme 
Court opinions to create a statutory cause of action. In determining the 
bounds of Congressional intent in creating that statutory right we look 
to Congress's statements about pre-Smith case law as instructive for our 
purposes, namely, to "say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 
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       social security system with myriad exceptions flowing 
       from a wide variety of religious beliefs. The obligation 
       to pay the social security tax initially is not 
       fundamentally different from the obligation to pay 
       income taxes; the difference -- in theory at least-- is 
       that the social security tax revenues are segregated for 
       use only in furtherance of the statutory program. There 
       is no principled way, for purposes of this case, to 
       distinguish between general taxes and those imposed 
       under the Social Security Act. If, for example, a 
       religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain 
       percentage of the federal budget can be identified as 
       devoted to war-related activities, such individuals 
       would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from 
       paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax 
       system could not function if denominations were 
       allowed to challenge the tax system because tax 
       payments were spent in a manner that violates their 
       religious belief. . . . Because the broad public interest 
       in maintaining sound tax system is of such a high 
       order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of 
       taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax. 
 
       455 U.S. at 259-60. 
 
In Hernandez, members of the Church of Scientology raised 
several challenges to the disallowance of claimed 
exemptions for the monies they had paid for spiritual 
training classes and sessions, including a free exercise 
challenge. In upholding the disallowance of exemptions in 
the face of their free exercise challenge, the Hernandez 
court relied on Lee: 
 
       [O]ur decision in Lee establishes that even a 
       substantial burden would be justified by the "broad 
       public interest in maintaining a sound tax system," 
       free of "myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety 
       of religious beliefs." 455 U.S. at 260. . . . That these 
       cases involve federal income taxes, not the Social 
       Security system, is of no consequence. Ibid. The fact 
       that Congress has already crafted some deductions and 
       exemptions in the Code also is of no consequence, for 
       the guiding principle is that a tax "must be uniformly 
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       applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly 
       otherwise." Id. at 261. 
 
       490 U.S. at 699 (emphasis added in original). 
 
Lee and Hernandez are both part of a line of cases that 
have refused to recognize free exercise challenges to the 
payment of taxes or penalties imposed due to a refusal to 
pay taxes as a protest against the military activities of the 
United States. See, e.g., Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 
1166 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Graves v. Commissioner, 
579 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1978); First v. Commissioner, 547 
F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Autenreith v. Cullen, 
418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969); see also Bethel Baptist 
Church v. United States, 822 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(social security taxes); Kahn v. United States , 753 F.2d 
1208, 1215-16 (3d Cir. 1985); McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 
832 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1987); Nelson v. United States, 796 
F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1986); McKee v. United States, 781 F.2d 
1043 (4th Cir. 1985); Collett v. United States , 781 F.2d 53 
(6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Jenney v. United States, 755 
F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1985); Wall v. United States, 756 F.2d 
52 (8th Cir. 1985); Welch v. United States, 750 F.2d 1101 
(1st Cir. 1985); Ballinger v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d 1287 
(10th Cir. 1984); cf. United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 
850 (3d Cir. 1973) (First Amendment an insufficient 
defense to tax evasion).6 
 
In the case before us, the Tax Court stated that the 
"uniform, mandatory participation in the Federal income 
tax system, irrespective of religious belief, is a compelling 
governmental interest. . . . As a result, requiring petitioner's 
participation in the Federal income tax system is the only, 
and thus the least restrictive, means of furthering the 
Government's interest." See Adams v. Commissioner, 110 
T.C. 137, 139 (1998), citing Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699- 
700; Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. Adams argues that the tax court 
misconstrued the compelling interest, and did so in so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In discussing instances in which the "compelling interest" test has 
been used to uphold governmental practices, Congress cited cases 
disallowing the availability of tax exemptions on the basis of religious 
practice and belief, namely, Hernandez, Lee, and Bob Jones University v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). See S. Rep. No. 103-111 at 5. 
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broad a manner, that the court did not address the "least 
restrictive means" prong. She contends that the government 
did not meet its burden in this regard. We disagree. 
 
Mindful of the comments of both the House and Senate, 
while we are not bound by the results in Lee and 
Hernandez, we cannot help but be guided by their 
reasoning in determining whether the least restrictive 
means have been employed to further the government's 
compelling interest. Viewing the requirements of RFRA 
through the helpful lens of pre-Smith case law, we conclude 
that the nature of the compelling interest involved-- as 
characterized by the Supreme Court in Lee-- converts the 
least restrictive means inquiry into a rhetorical question 
that has been answered by the analysis in Lee. The least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest in the 
collection of taxes -- a compelling interest that Adams has 
conceded -- is in fact, to implement that system in a 
uniform, mandatory way, with Congress determining in the 
first instance if exemptions are to built into the legislative 
scheme. The question of whether government could 
implement a less restrictive means of income tax collection 
surfaced in pre-Smith case law and was answered in the 
negative based on the practical need of the government for 
uniform administration of taxation, given particularly 
difficult problems with administration should exceptions on 
religious grounds be carved out by the courts. See Lee, 455 
U.S. at 259-60. We acknowledge the sincerity of Adams's 
beliefs, but as the Supreme Court noted in Lee, we can 
easily imagine a plethora of other sects that would also 
have an equally legitimate concern with the usage of tax 
dollars to fund activities antithetical to their religion. See 
455 U.S. at 259. We also note that the same concerns with 
religious pluralism that prompted the passage of RFRA 
have also prompted past courts' reluctance to become 
involved in determining whether a claimant's beliefs are 
"sincerely held," due to the multiplicity of beliefs in this 
country; these concerns also fortify our resistance to court- 
created exemptions to the income tax system. See Lee, 455 
U.S. at 259; Lull, 602 F.2d at 1168-69; cf. Kahn, 753 F.2d 
at 1214. 
 
Our approach to this particular form of tax challenge 
under RFRA is consistent with that of the Ninth Circuit 
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Court of Appeals, the only other circuit court to have 
wrestled with this issue in a similar factual context. In 
Goehring v. Brophy, a group of college students challenged 
the collection of student fees under RFRA, as those fees 
subsidized a health insurance plan that covered abortion 
services. 94 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 1335 (1997), overruled by 117 S. Ct. 2157. In 
analyzing the "least restrictive means" prong of the RFRA 
test, the court analogized the challenge to university 
funding to that of free exercise challenges to the 
government's use of tax dollars. See id. at 1300. The court 
then looked to Lee as its guide, and found that the fiscal 
vitality of the university fee system would be undermined if 
the plaintiffs were exempted from paying their fees on free 
exercise grounds, as mandatory participation was 
necessary to ensure the survival of the student health 
insurance program. See id. The court also relied on the 
reasoning in Autenreith, a pre-Lee war tax protester case, 
as persuasive authority for its decision that mandatory 
student participation in a health insurance scheme was the 
least restrictive means of accomplishing the University's 
goals. 94 F.3d at 1301-02. We also find this reasoning 
instructive: 
 
       The Income Tax Act does not `aid one religion, aid all 
       religions, or prefer one religion over another.' Not does 
       it punish anyone `for entertaining or professing 
       religious beliefs or disbeliefs' . . . . It taxes plaintiffs like 
       all others, because they are citizens or residents who 
       have taxable income. On matters religious, it is 
       neutral. If every citizen could refuse to pay all or part 
       of his taxes because he disapproved of the 
       government's use of the money, on religious grounds, 
       the ability of the government to function could be 
       impaired or even destroyed. . . . There are few, if any 
       governmental activities to which some person or group 
       might not object on religious grounds. 
 
       418 F.2d at 588-89, cited in 94 F.3d at 1301-02. 
 
In another case decided by the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, Droz v. Commissioner, the appellant had 
challenged the assessment of unpaid self-employment 
social security taxes under the free exercise clause, 
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claiming that he had religious objections to the social 
security system. 48 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 1995). The 
court determined that the RFRA test should be applied to 
his claim, and then looked to Lee as the determinative case 
in analyzing his claim. See id. at 1123. The Droz court 
denied his claim, noting that although compulsory 
participation in the social security system interfered with 
his free exercise rights, allowing him to opt out of the 
system on religious grounds would threaten the stability of 
the social security system by opening the door to myriad 
religious exceptions. See id. at 1123-24; cf. Sherbert, 374 
U.S. at 408-09 (noting that administrative problems 
rendering a scheme unworkable could be the basis for 
denial of religious accommodation).7 
 
Adams also argues that a later Congressional enactment 
of the exemption the Supreme Court refused to allow in Lee 
demonstrates that the Commissioner can and should 
accommodate religion through a series of exemptions or 
alternative approaches to tax collection or at least should 
prove why such religiously-based exemptions are not 
feasible. However, in making this argument, Adams 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. A number of RFRA cases arising in other factual contexts also 
demonstrate a sensitivity to the influence of pre-RFRA case law on the 
analysis of claims at hand. For example, in the context of RFRA 
challenges to prison policies and regulations, courts found that they 
still 
owe substantial deference to the judgment of prison administrators -- as 
was the practice under prior case law in determining the interests being 
furthered and means employed. See Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 
512 (11th Cir. 1996), overruled by 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (finding that 
the "least restrictive means" prong of RFRA was coextensive with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), 
in which the "limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no 
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular 
governmental interest involved."); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476 (2d 
Cir. 1996), overruled by 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (stating in its analysis 
of 
a challenge to TB regulations that its inquiry would occur "against the 
backdrop of prior decisions recognizing that courts are ill-equipped to 
substitute their judgments on matters of prison administration for those 
of prison authorities"); Hamilton v. Schiro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554 n.9 (8th 
Cir. 1996), overruled by 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (court looks to Supreme 
Court precedent, RFRA's legislative history, and its own case law for 
guidance in interpreting RFRA). 
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misconstrues the nature of the tax system itself. We do not 
doubt that such legislative enactments can and do occur, 
but tax exemptions are a matter of legislative grace, see 
Lull, 602 F.2d at 1168, citing New Colonial Ice Co. v. 
Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934). It does not follow from 
Congressional action on such matters that the 
Commissioner or the courts are therefore encouraged to 
carve out exceptions to the statutory scheme.8 
 
Adams contends further that a finding against her is 
tantamount to exempting the IRS from RFRA altogether. We 
disagree. She has contested the current system of income 
tax collection on the basis of her religious beliefs, and the 
result this court reaches in evaluating her particular 
challenge is dictated by prior case law. This finding does 
not preclude the application of RFRA to the IRS in other 
factual contexts. In sum, we find that the Tax Court 
engaged in an appropriate analysis of Adams's RFRA claim 
based upon United States v. Lee, and that appellee was not 
required to produce evidence under the "least restrictive 
means" prong of RFRA in order to prevail. 
 
B. Liability for Penalties Assessed 
 
Under 26 U.S.C. S 6651(a), if a taxpayer fails to file, a 
penalty will be added unless the taxpayer can demonstrate 
1) lack of willful neglect, and 2) reasonable cause. Willful 
neglect may be read as "meaning a conscious, intentional 
failure or reckless indifference." See United States v. Boyle, 
469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985). Under the case law and 
appropriate regulations, in order to demonstrate 
"reasonable cause," a taxpayer must demonstrate that she 
exercised ordinary care and prudence but nevertheless was 
unable to file the return within the time allowed. 9 See id.; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The fact that Adams has suggested a number of alternative modes of 
tax collection for herself (religiously-based checkoffs on the tax forms, 
or 
a separate non-military based fund for tax monies) is beside the point. 
As Justice Blackmun noted, "A judge would be unimaginative indeed if 
he could not come up with something a little less`drastic' or a little 
less 
`restrictive' in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote 
to 
strike legislation down." Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist 
Workers 
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (concurring). 
 
9. A "reasonable cause" exception on the basis of religious opposition to 
war is somewhat difficult to claim from the outset, due to the existence 
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Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 174, 178-79 (3d 
Cir. 1978). Whether the elements that constitute 
"reasonable cause" are present in "a given case is a 
question of fact, but what elements must be present to 
constitute `reasonable cause' is a question of law." Boyle, 
469 U.S. at 249 n.8. 
 
Adams claims that Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 
1132, 1136 (3d Cir. 1970), a conscientious objector case, 
indicates that she was compelled by her beliefs not to file, 
and that as a result, she has demonstrated reasonable 
cause under the statute, because the beliefs inducing her 
not to file her returns were so powerful that her actions 
were beyond her control. In so claiming, she cites to 
language in Scott stating that: "beliefs of conscience are 
always beyond one's control; one cannot sincerely turn his 
conscience on and off at will." 431 F.2d at 1136. Similarly, 
Adams claims that the waiver provision of section 6654(e)(3) 
for "unusual circumstances" applies to her case, claiming 
that her adherence to religious beliefs and subsequent 
refusal to pay taxes -- the "reasonable cause" argument set 
forth above -- is a sufficiently unusual circumstance to 
nullify the penalty, despite the fact that it is somewhat rare 
for a court to recognize a "reasonable cause" exception as 
an "unusual circumstance" that precludes a section 6654(a) 
penalty. See In re Carlson, 126 F.3d 915, 921 (7th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1388 (1998) (listing cases); 
Webster v. United States, 375 F.2d 814 (Ct. Cl. 1967) 
(finding a reasonable cause exception due to changes in tax 
code and taxpayer's lack of information as rural landowner).10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of cases upholding the assessment of a "frivolous return" penalty under 
26 U.S.C. S 6702 against persons claiming "war tax" deductions or 
exemptions. See Nelson, 796 F.2d at 165-67 (addressing constitutionality 
of section 6702); Welch, 750 F.2d at 1108-09 (rejecting free exercise 
challenge to section 6702); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, S. 
Rep. 97-494 (1982), 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1023-24 (discussing protest 
returns, including "war tax" protest returns, as necessitating the 
enactment of section 6702). 
 
10. Adams also argues that the statutory scheme that permits penalties 
if the taxpayer demonstrates "reasonable cause" or "unusual 
circumstances" has constitutional implications. She contends, relying on 
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We find Adams's arguments appealing, but ultimately 
unconvincing. She has misconstrued Scott; the focus of the 
court's analysis in Scott was on the sincerity of the beliefs 
of the individual in question -- the sincerity of Adams's 
beliefs is not in question. However, despite the sincerity of 
those beliefs, her claim has returned this court to a well- 
established line of cases involving challenges to the 
collection of taxes on religious grounds. Although Adams's 
beliefs may be unusual as compared to the general 
population, the very body of case law relating to war tax 
protesters indicates that in the realm of tax litigation, she 
is one of many. As a result, her "compulsion" argument 
affords her no excuse, as the prior plaintiffs were also 
compelled by religious belief, but, like Adams, made the 
difficult decision to act in a manner contrary to law. 
Moreover, Adams is asking this court to draw a distinction 
between holding sincerely felt political and religious beliefs 
and facing the consequences of those beliefs; we have been 
and continue to be reluctant to make such a distinction. 
We have noted, in slightly different contexts, that plaintiffs 
engaging in civil disobedience through tax protests must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
language in Smith, that where a governmental entity has in place a 
system of "individual exemptions," the failure to extend those exemptions 
to a case of religious hardship constitutes discrimination on the basis of 
religious belief. 494 U.S. at 884. The "reasonable cause" exception, 
according to Adams, is one such "individual exemption," and therefore, 
the assessment of a penalty against her when she has demonstrated 
"reasonable cause" is unconstitutional. The concept of "individual 
exemptions" in Smith is not the same as "reasonable cause" in the I.R.C., 
and we have little difficulty finding that the imposition of penalties on 
Adams does not constitute discrimination on the basis of her religion. 
The exemptions at issue here are uniform and facially neutral; the 
exemption at issue in Sherbert allowed for special protection for 
employees opposed to working on Sundays, and allowed the Commission 
making the determination to take religious and personal beliefs into 
account; here, the exemptions at issue are uniform and facially neutral. 
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401-03, 406-09. In terms of both statutory 
interpretation and constitutional interpretation, Adams's definitions of 
"reasonable cause" and "unusual circumstances" are outside of the 
bounds of what these terms mean. See McMahan v. Commissioner, 114 
F.3d 366, 368-69 (2d Cir. 1997) (setting out parameters of reasonable 
cause exception). 
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pay the penalties incurred as a result of engaging in such 
disobedience. See Kahn, 753 F.2d at 1215-16; cf. 
Malinowski, 472 F.2d at 855-58. 
 
We will affirm the decision of the Tax Court. 
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